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Case No. 10696
IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MYRTLE FLEWELLING CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.
HAROLD ELWOOD CHRISTENSEN,
Defendant and Respondent.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff and defendant were married January
22, 1964. Pleadings and T-4. Plaintiff had been previously
married and widowed, T-4. Defendant had children by
prior marriage, T-5. The plaintiff was 61 (in error being
68) years of age, T-11. Defendant was 67 years of age,
T-11. No children were born to them nor are any expected.
The plaintiff's action seeking a divorce was dated
March 3, 1965. On the same day the defendant signed an
appearance and waiver and the parties signed a stipulation
in which each released claims against the property of the
other and the plaintiff waived all alimony (paragraph 7).
It is further provided that the defendant pay the plaintiff

$5,000.00 by transferring monies in a savings account
and accrued benefits in Fireman's Credit Union (paragraph
2). Withdrawal instruments were signed by the defendant
and the funds within a few days of March 3 were delivered
to the plaintiff.
The defendant on March 12 filed an answer and
counter-claim. Neither the answer nor the counter-claim
referred to the stipulation nor asked relief from its
provisions.
The cause came on for trial September 30, 1965, with
the parties and counsel present. The Court inquired, "Is
there any contest on the divorce?", to which defendant's
counsel answered "No, sir," and at T-3 the Court said:
"There is no contest on the issues for the grounds of
divorce." Mr. Patterson: "That's right, your Honor".
The plaintiff then testified in support of her allegation of mental cruelty. No effort was made to cross
examine the plaintiff concerning her cause of action, and
the Court indicated that she had shown a prima facie case
of cruelty, and "I'll grant a divorce on those grounds," T-9.
Testimony was then offered that Mr. Christensen
moved into the home owned by Mrs. Christensen which
was fully furnished. That he brought an old car, and that
the plaintiff owned an automobile. That she withdrew
money and paid her own expenses on the honeymoon, T-8.
That the plaintiff lost social security benefits of $80.00
per month, T-10. The balance of the hearing is principally
statements of counsel to the Court with the Court recessing
the proceedings with the observations made at T-13 and
14.
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The transcript does not indicate any instructions
concerning the submission of briefs, but reference is made
to them in the minute entry entered in said cause under
the date of September 30, 1965.
The Court's determination to reject the stipulation
without pleadings or testimony attacking it, together with
a misunderstanding of plaintiff's counsel in a conversation
had with the Court prompted the plaintiff to file her
affidavit of prejudice. ln counsel's conversation with the
Court, counsel erroneously concluded that the judge was
reluctant to continue in the trial of said cause, and that
if an affidavit of prejudice were filed that this cause
would be assigned to another department of the court.
On order assigning the case to another judge for trial was
submitted on hearing denied and went unsigned.
Plaintiff's counsel, anticipating the transfer, filed no
memorandum of authorities within the time allotted. Thereupon the defendant moved the Court to enter an order
finding the issues of law reserved by the Court in the
defendant's favor. Hearing on said motion was had on
the 15th day of November, 1965, after which the Court
extended to plaintiff an opportunity within ten days to
file his memorandum for the assistance of the Court. Such
memorandum was filed, with the defendant's counsel filing
an answering brief.
On receipt of counsel's brief, the Court, having deemed
the matter to be under advisement awaiting briefs, entered
its memorandum decision on the 4th day of January, 1966,
as the same appears in the files herein.
Being advised that a reconciliation was under consideration by the parties, plaintiff's counsel did not prepare
any findings of fact nor conclusions of law. That there3

upon the defendant submitted to the Court his findings
of fact and conclusions of law which were signed by the
Court on the 11th day of March, 1966, although the plaintiff
did not receive a copy of said findings of fact, conclusions
of law, or decree until the 15th day of March, 1966.
Plaintiff then filed her objections to the memorandum
decision; a motion for an order vacating the entry of the
defendant's findings, and a motion for the entry of plaintiff's findings. The defendant made objections to the plaintiff's findings.
Thereafter the Court, under the date of March 17,
1966, signed the plaintiff's findings and entered an order
vacating the entry of the defendant's findings of fact and
conclusions of law.
Thereafter on May 2, 1966, the Court with counsel
indicated its dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's findings,
indicated that questions concerning the plaintiff's and
defendant's properties were not fully gone into at the time
of the trial, and continued the matter for further hearing
"for the sole purpose of receiving testimony concerning
the property and the value of the property of the parties."
The transcript of proceedings, May 2, 1966, P-2.
Thereafter on June 24, 1966, further hearing was had
in said matter. At said hearing, the defendant offered
testimony concerning the value of the properties of the
parties, and the plaintiff made proffers of proof.
The Court thereupon entered its or<ler affirming its
previous memorandum of decision and directing the defendant's findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree
be entered as the judgment in said cause.
4

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff seeks a reversal of that portion of the
judgment requiring the plaintiff to return $3,500.00 of
the $5,000.00 paid to the plaintiff by the defendant under
the Stipulation signed by the parties and seeks to have
this Court enter its own order approving the Stipulation
and authorizing the retention by the plaintiff of the
$5,000.00 paid to her under the Stipulation.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1:
ERROR OF THE TRIAL COURT IN CONTINUING
TO HEAR AND DETERMINE THE ISSUES IN SAID
CAUSE AFTER THE FILING OF AN AFFIDAVIT OF
PREJUDICE UNDER RULES 63 (B) U.R.C.P.
Anderson vs. Anderson 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 P 2nd 264
the Court on page 265 commented on a situation where
an Affidavit of Prejudice had been filed against the trial
judge and said as follows,
"If the rule means anything at all it means that
what is plainly stated to the effect that the Judge
against whom the Affidavit of Bias and Prejudice
thereafter cannot proceed to hear the issue himself.
Our only conclusion is that any order of judgment
.based on evidence thereafter taken by him would
be ineffective against the affiant. It follows that
this case must be remanded for another trial of the
issues."
POINT II
ERROR OF THE COURT IN CHANGING THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES WHEN:
5

A. THE STIPULATION WAIVED ALIMONY AND
WAS A PROPERTY SETTLEMENT.
B. WHEN THE PLAINTIFF DlD NOT CHALLENGE THE STIPULATION NOR SEEK ANY DEPARTURE FROM IT.

C. WHEN THE DEFENDANT DID NOT CHALLENGE THE STIPULATION BY PLEADINGS NOR
OFFER ANY TESTIMONY THAT THE SAME WAS
NOT ACCEPTABLE NOR THAT THE SAME WAS
OBTAINED BY FRAUD, DURESS, OR MISREPRESENTATION.
The power of the Court to change the stipulated provisions of the parties regarding alimony and support money
is generally conceded based upon public policy considerations, See
Barraclough vs. Barraclough, 111 P 2d 792 - 100 U 196
Callister vs. Callister, 261 P 2d 944 - UCA Section
30-3-4
Jones vs. Jones, 139 P 2d 222 - 104 U 275
Madsen vs. Madsen, 27G P 2d 917 - 2 Utah 2d 423
24 Am J ur 2d Section 670
So far as counsel has b€€n able to find, this Court has
never been called upon to answer the following proposition.
Does the Court have discretion to change a stipulated
property settlement agreement without provisions for alimoney or support money where the defendant does not by
pleadings or testimony show the same to be unfair or to
have been procured by undue intluence, fraud or misrepresentation.
In the Hall case, (177 P 2d 731) a property settlement
was presented to the Court which provided that the de6

fendant pay to the wife $65.00 per month in semi-monthly
payments. The defendant did not answer nor appear. At
the hearing where the plaintiff testified that the sum
was reasonable for her support and that her husband was
earning $150.00 per rnonth. The Court struck from the
findings the figure of $65.00 and changed it to $80.00
per month. The defendant became delinquent on the basis
of the $80.00 per month whereupon the plaintiff filed an
affidavit alleging the arrearage. The defendant was found
in contempt for failure to pay the $80.00 per month. From
this contempt finding an appeal was taken.
The Stipulation signed by the parties was specific in
several aspects.
a. It is provided that the award to the plaintiff shall
be a property settlement of all claims against the
defendant.
b. There was no provision for periodic payment.
c. There was no provision for alimony but rather a
provision that the payment was in lieu of alimony.
d. The settlement was a lump sum and was accepted
in lieu of alimony support money or loss of social
security payments.
e. It released claims against each other's property
together ·with all other claims including promises made
prior to the marriage, obligations accruing during the
marriage, or subsequent thereto.
f. Settlement money was paid and partly spent.
Admittedly, tlte Courts have under public policy considerations:
a. Ignored the label put on the property settlement
7

Ross vs. Ross, 403 P 2d 19
b. Found periodic property settlement prov1s10ns to
have been alimony, 24 Am Jur Section 670.
c. Modified property settlement provisions where parts
of the Stipulation made provision for alimony, 24 Am
Jur Section 670.
Conceding the desirability of such public policy there
would still seem to be equally as important a public policy
for the Court not to over ride the obvious contractual
desires and provisions of parties desiring to settle between
themselves the financial side of their separation. Certainly
this should not be done until it has been established that
the Stipulation was improperly obtained.
In the Hall case, page 733: "It is true that we have held
that a Stipulation for an alimony settlement is only a
recommendation from the Court." See Jones vs. Jones 104
Utah 275 139 P 2d 222, "But we did not mean by that that
it was to be given no weight at all. Lacking any proof to
the contrary the lower Court could assume that the parties
best know their own financial standing and capabilities
and accept their Stipulation for its face value unless the
Court Records before the Court obviously indicate that
to accept the Stipulation would not accomplish equity. To
ignore the wishes of the parties without grounds for doing
so clearly is an arbitrary and capricious act." The judgment of contempt was reversed.
In the Mathie case, (363, P 2d 779 12 Utah 2d 116,)
following a prior divorce suit, the parties entered into a
reconciliation agreement. In a second subsequent action
the plaintiff did not seek alimony or support money, and
none was awarded, but the Court generally followed the
8

pattern set by the parties in the reconciliation agreement.
The appeal was taken attacking the disposition of the
property. The Court makes rather an extensive review
of the authorities but notes "However, we are not disposed
to disagree with the proposition that where neither spouse
is in a position of undue disadvantage and they voluntarily
enter into a contract which affects their rights only, it
should be regarded as presumptively valid, and the Court
should give it effect unless there are persuasive reasons
for doing otherwise."
In Adams vs. Adams 177 P 2d page 265, the parties

had reached a stipulation providing for the division of
their property and for the payment of alimony for 18 months
only and support for a minor child. The plaintiff indicated
her acceptance of the stipulation and her counsel noted
the negotiations preceding the settlement. Despite this th~
Court refused to approve the property settlement, directed
the plaintiff to file an amended complaint seeking a greater sum. The defendant refused to stipulate the change and
after default the Court entered an order for the larger
sum consistent with his notions. The defendant appealed,
contending that the property settlement is valid in the
absence of a finding; that it is inequitable or was procured
by fraud or compulsion and should have been approved
by the trial Court.
The Court analyzes three categories of support and
maintenance provisions noting a third category where
the wife by contract waives all support and maintenance.
The Court on page 267 notes as follows. "Property settlement agreements occupy a favored position in the law of
this state and are sanctioned by the Civil Code." "When
the parties have finally agreed upon the division of their
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property, the Courts are loath to disturb their agreement
except for equitable considerations. A property settlement
agreement, therefore, that is not tainted by fraud or compulsion or is not in violation of the confidential relationship
of the parties is valid and binding on the court."
"If the contract was not fradulent when made, and
there was no violation of the confidential relationship, it
will be binding on the Court and there can be no modification of the payments after the decree without the consent
of the parties." The Court notes on page 269: "If her consent to the agreement was procured through fraud or compulsion, or if circumstances are such that the Court finds
the agreement inequitable, the Court may withhold approval
of the agreement ... since nothing was shown to indicate
that the agreement was inequitable, the parties are bound
by the agreement."
For the Court without a challenge from either party
by pleadings or testimony challenging the manner in which
the Stipulation was obtained to arbitrarily impose new
terms upon the parties was an abuse of discretion. Alexander vs. Alexander 199 P 2d 348 and Halloway vs. Halloway,
179 P 2d 22 held that a property settlement agreement containing provisions for support and maintenance of wife
as part of the division of property of the parties is binding
on the trial court in absence of fraud, duress, undue influence, violation of confidential relation, or other circumstances showing the agreement to be inequitable, and after
approval of trial court, such provisions cannot be modified
by the Court without consent of the parties.
The binding effect of a wife's contractual waiver of
alimony must be recognized unless appropriate procedures
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are envoked to avoid the waiver. See Cockrum vs. Cockrum,
328 p 2d 1000.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT SO CLEARLY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION THAT THIS COURT SHOULD SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF THE TRIAL
COURT AND ORDER JUDGMENT ENTERED PROVIDING THAT THE PLAINTIFF RETAIN ALL OF THE
$5,000.00 PAID HER UNDER THE STIPULATION.
Despite the advantages generally felt to exist in the
trial Court and this Court's disposition to affirm if there
is any evidence to sustain the position taken by the trial
Court, this Court has the right to substitute its judgment
for that of the trial Court under proper circumstances.
See Wilson case, 296 P 2d 977 5 Utah 2d 79, where the
Court said on page 981 as follows, "It is true as defendant contends, that a divorce proceeding is equitable and
that it is within the prerogative of this Court to review the
evidence and to substitute its judgment for that of the
trial Court under proper circumstances." See also, Curry
vs. Curry, 321 P 2d 93~ 7 Utah 2d 198, where this Court
reduced the period over which the defendant was required
to pay alimony.
POINT IV
REFUSAL OF THE COURT TO ACCEPT THE
PLAINTIFF'S PROFFERS OF PROOF.
The Court's memorandum decision contains the statement "The plaintiff, however, having considerable more
property than the defendant" was a finding reached
by the Court without any testimony supporting it. The
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plaintiff complained of this in her objections to the memorandum decision. To reach this objection, the Court
scheduled the second hearing for "the sole purpose of
receiving testimony concerning the property and the value
of the property of the parties."
The plaintiff offered to prove the cost to her of a
single premium no reserve or terminal fund annuity which
would provide the benefits of her social security loss by
the marriage and also the amount of $5,000.00 received
by her that remained unspent. These were in view of the
plaintiff, proper testimony concerning "the property of
the parties." While its receipt would not likely have changed
the Court's view, the same should have been received in
·evidence.

CONCLUSION
This Court should on its own initiative order the
decree modified to permit the plaintiff to retain the
$5,000.00 paid her under the Stipulation.
Respectfully submitted,

GLENN W. ADAMS
Attorney for Appellant
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